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Discusses Anglo-American policy in the Middle East under Kennedy and Johnson, as well as under British Conservative and Labour governments; Provides a historical background on the Anglo-American Middle East for the 1950s; Analyses Western policy toward Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and toward the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf. The author provides an extensive study of the common British and American interest in the Middle East (hence the term Anglo-American Middle East) under Kennedy and Johnson. Contrary to recent scholarly opinion, the author argues that the loss of influence to the Soviet Union and Arab radicalism in the Middle East was not the result of lack of power but lack of will. Britain, during the period of Harold Wilson's Labour government (1964-1970) withdrew from its Middle Eastern bases for ideological reasons, namely a distaste for imperialism and colonialism. The United States, while placing great store in a continued British presence east of Suez, was unable or unwilling to prevent the British withdrawal. And as the British withdrawal gathered momentum, American disinterest toward the Middle East increased.
The nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 triggered one of the gravest international crises since the Second World War. The fiftieth anniversary of the Suez crisis in 2006 presented an ideal opportunity to re-visit and reassess this seminal episode in post-war history. Although much has been written on Suez, this study provides fresh perspectives by reflecting the latest research from leading international authorities on the crisis and its aftermath. By drawing on recently released documents, by including previously neglected aspects of Suez, and by reassessing its more familiar ones, the volume makes a key contribution to furthering research on - and understanding of - the crisis. The v...
Discusses Anglo-American policy in the Middle East under Kennedy and Johnson, as well as under British Conservative and Labour governments. This title provides a historical background on the Anglo-American Middle East for the 1950s. It analyses Western policy toward Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser, and toward the Arabian Peninsula.
Although Britain’s formal imperial role in the smaller, oil-rich sheikdoms of the Arab Gulf – Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – ended in 1971, Britain continued to have a strong interest and continuing presence in the region. This book explores the nature of Britain’s role after the formal end of empire. It traces the historical events of the post-imperial years, including the 1973 oil shock, the fall of the Shah in Iran and the beginnings of the Iran-Iraq War, considers the changing positions towards the region of other major world powers, including the United States, and engages with debates on the nature of empire and the end of empire. The book is a sequel to the authors’ highly acclaimed previous books Britain's Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States, 1950-71 (Routledge 2004) and Ending Empire in the Middle East: Britain, the United States and Post-war Decolonization, 1945-1973 (Routledge 2012).
Offers an analysis on how Great Britain and the United States confronted the initial emergence of fundamentalist Islam with the occupation of the Holy Mosque in Mecca and Khomenei's revolution in Iran. Despite the loss of Iran, the United States and Britain managed to secure the Arab side of the Persian Gulf in the Western camp.
This book reconstructs and explains the arms relationship that successive U.S. administrations developed with the Shah of Iran between 1950 and 1979. This relationship has generally been neglected in the extant literature leading to a series of omissions and distortions in the historical record. By detailing how and why Iran transitioned from a primitive military aid recipient in the 1950s to America’s primary military credit customer in the late 1960s and 1970s, this book provides a detailed and original contribution to the understanding of a key Cold War episode in U.S. foreign policy. By drawing on extensive declassified documents from more than 10 archives, the investigation demonstrat...
This book is a major and wide-ranging re-assessment of Anglo-American relations in the Middle Eastern context. It analyses the process of ending of empire in the Middle East from 1945 to the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Based on original research into both British and American archival sources, it covers all the key events of the period, including the withdrawal from Palestine, the Anglo-American coup against the Musaddiq regime in Iran, the Suez Crisis and its aftermath, the Iraqi and Yemeni revolutions, and the Arab-Israeli conflicts. It demonstrates that, far from experiencing a ‘loss of nerve’ or tamely acquiescing in a transfer of power to the United States, British decision-makers robus...
The first comprehensive study of Iran's political and cultural interactions with Africa during the Cold War and decolonisation.
Four generic motives have historically led states to initiate war: fear, interest, standing, and revenge. Using an original data set, Richard Ned Lebow examines the distribution of wars across three and a half centuries and argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, only a minority of these were motivated by security or material interest. Instead, the majority are the result of a quest for standing, and for revenge - an attempt to get even with states who had previously made successful territorial grabs. Lebow maintains that today none of these motives are effectively served by war - it is increasingly counterproductive - and that there is growing recognition of this political reality. His analysis allows for more fine-grained and persuasive forecasts about the future of war as well as highlighting areas of uncertainty.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to the national security debate on this important subject, as our nation continues to grapple with a variety of problems associated with the future of the Middle East and the ongoing challenge of advancing U.S. interests in a time of Middle East turbulence.