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Trade Costs of Sovereign Debt Restructurings
Sovereign debt restructurings have been shown to influence the dynamics of imports and exports. This paper shows that the impact can vary substantially depending on whether the restructuring takes place preemptively without missing payments to creditors, or whether it takes place after a default has occurred. We document that countries with post-default restructurings experience on average: (i) a more severe and protracted decline in imports, (ii) a larger fall in exports, and (iii) a sharper and more prolonged decline in both GDP, investment and real exchange rate than preemptive cases. These stylized facts are confirmed by panel regressions and local projection estimates, and a range of robustness checks including for the endogeneity of the restructuring strategy. Our findings suggest that a country’s choice of how to go about restructuring its debt can have major implications for the costs it incurs from restructuring.
Sovereign Bond Prices, Haircuts and Maturity
Rejecting a common assumption in the sovereign debt literature, we document that creditor losses (“haircuts”) during sovereign restructuring episodes are asymmetric across debt instruments. We code a comprehensive dataset on instrument-specific haircuts for 28 debt restructurings with private creditors in 1999–2015 and find that haircuts on shorter-term debt are larger than those on debt of longer maturity. In a standard asset pricing model, we show that increasing short-run default risk in the run-up to a restructuring episode can explain the stylized fact. The data confirms the predicted relation between perceived default risk, bond prices, and haircuts by maturity.
Sovereign Debt Restructurings in Grenada
This paper documents the two debt restructurings that Grenada undertook in 2004–06 and 2013–15.Both restructurings emerged as a consequence of weak fiscal and debt situations, whichbecame unsustainable soon after external shocks hit the island economy. The two restructurings provided liquidity relief, with the second one involving a principal haircut. However, the first restructuring was not able to secure long-term debt sustainability. Grenada’s restructuring experience shows the importance of (1) establishing appropriate debt restructuring objectives; (2) committing to policy reforms and maintaining ownership of the restructuring goals; and (3) engaging closely and having clear communications with creditors.
Sovereign Debt Restructurings in Grenada
This paper documents the two debt restructurings that Grenada undertook in 2004–06 and 2013–15.Both restructurings emerged as a consequence of weak fiscal and debt situations, whichbecame unsustainable soon after external shocks hit the island economy. The two restructurings provided liquidity relief, with the second one involving a principal haircut. However, the first restructuring was not able to secure long-term debt sustainability. Grenada’s restructuring experience shows the importance of (1) establishing appropriate debt restructuring objectives; (2) committing to policy reforms and maintaining ownership of the restructuring goals; and (3) engaging closely and having clear communications with creditors.
Barbados’ 2018–19 Sovereign Debt Restructuring–A Sea Change?
This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of Barbados’ 2018–19 sovereign debt restructuring—its first ever. The restructuring was comprehensive, featuring several rarely used approaches, including the restructuring of treasury bills, and the use of a retrofitted collective action mechanism. The debt restructuring has helped to set Barbados’ public debt on a clear downward trajectory. A sustained reform effort, maintaining high primary surpluses and ambitious structural reforms, will be needed to gradually reduce public debt from about 160 percent of GDP before the restructuring to the country’s 60 percent debt-to-GDP target.
Building a Common Future in Southern Africa
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) is the oldest customs union in the world, with significant opportunities ahead for creating higher economic growth and increased welfare benefits to the people of the region, by fulfilling its vision to become an economic community with a common market and monetary union. This volume describes policy options to address the barriers to equitable and sustainable development in the region and outlines a plan for deeper regional integration.
Sovereign Defaults, External Debt, and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics
Emerging countries experience real exchange rate depreciations around defaults. In this paper, we examine this observed pattern empirically and through the lens of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The theoretical model explicitly incorporates bond issuances in local and foreign currencies, and endogenous determination of real exchange rate and default risk. Our quantitative analysis replicates the link between real exchange rate depreciation and default probability around defaults and moments of the real exchange rate that match the data. Prior to default, interactions of real exchange rate depreciation, originated from a sequence of low tradable goods shocks with the sovereign’s large share of foreign currency debt, trigger defaults. In post-default periods, the resulting output costs and loss of market access due to default lead to further real exchange rate depreciation.
Welfare Effects of Monetary Integration
This paper proposes a quantitative assessment of the welfare effects arising from the Common Monetary Area (CMA) and an array of broader grouping among Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries. Model simulations suggest that (i) participating in the CMA benefits all members; (ii) joining the CMA individually is beneficial for all SADC members except Angola, Mauritius and Tanzania; (iii) creating a symmetric CMA-wide monetary union with a regional central bank carries some costs in terms of foregone anti-inflationary credibility; and (iv) SADC-wide symmetric monetary union continues to be beneficial for all except Mauritius, although the gains for existing CMA members are likely to be limited.
Is Banks’ Home Bias Good or Bad for Public Debt Sustainability?
Motivated by the recent increase in domestic banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign debt (i.e., home bias) in the European periphery, this paper analyzes implications of banks’ home bias for the sovereign’s debt sustainability. The main findings, based on a sample of advanced (AM) and emerging market (EM) economies, suggest that home bias generally reduces the cost of borrowing for AMs and EMs when debt levels are moderate to high. A worsening of market sentiments appears to dimish the favorable impact of home bias on cost of borrowing particularly for EMs. In addition, for AMs and EMs, higher home bias is associated with higher debt levels, and less responsive fiscal policy. The findings suggest that home bias indeed matters for debt sustainability: Home bias may provide fiscal breathing space, but delays in fiscal consolidation may actually delay problems until debt reaches dangerously high levels.
Belize's 2016-17 Sovereign Debt Restructuring - Third Time Lucky?
This paper examines the causes, processes, and outcomes of Belize’s 2016–17 sovereign debt restructuring—its third episode in last 10 years. As was the case in the earlier two restructurings, in 2006–07 and in 2012–13, the 2016–17 debt restructuring was executed through collaborative engagement with creditors outside an IMF-supported program. While providing liquidity relief and partially addressing long-term debt sustainability concerns, the restructuring will need to be underpinned by ambitious fiscal consolidation and growth-enhancing structural reforms to secure durable gains.
