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Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory
Computer science and economics have engaged in a lively interaction over the past fifteen years, resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory. Many problems that are central to modern computer science, ranging from resource allocation in large networks to online advertising, involve interactions between multiple self-interested parties. Economics and game theory offer a host of useful models and definitions to reason about such problems. The flow of ideas also travels in the other direction, and concepts from computer science are increasingly important in economics. This book grew out of the author's Stanford University course on algorithmic game theory, and aims to give students and other newcomers a quick and accessible introduction to many of the most important concepts in the field. The book also includes case studies on online advertising, wireless spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
Beyond the Worst-Case Analysis of Algorithms
Introduces exciting new methods for assessing algorithms for problems ranging from clustering to linear programming to neural networks.
Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
An analysis of the loss in performance caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. Most of us prefer to commute by the shortest route available, without taking into account the traffic congestion that we cause for others. Many networks, including computer networks, suffer from some type of this "selfish routing." In Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy, Tim Roughgarden studies the loss of social welfare caused by selfish, uncoordinated behavior in networks. He quantifies the price of anarchy—the worst-possible loss of social welfare from selfish routing—and also discusses several methods for improving the price of anarchy with centralized control. Roughgarden begins with a...
Algorithms Illuminated, Part 1
Algorithms Illuminated is an accessible introduction to algorithms for anyone with at least a little programming experience, based on a sequence of popular online courses. Part 1 covers asymptotic analysis and big-O notation, divide-and-conquer algorithms, randomized algorithms, and several famous algorithms for sorting and selection.
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics
This monograph comprises a series of ten lectures divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses on the communication and computational complexity of computing an (approximate) Nash equilibrium. Part 2 focuses on applications of computational complexity theory to game theory and economics.
Algorithms Illuminated (Part 3)
Accessible, no-nonsense, and programming language-agnostic introduction to algorithms. Part 3 covers greedy algorithms (scheduling, minimum spanning trees, clustering, Huffman codes) and dynamic programming (knapsack, sequence alignment, shortest paths, optimal search trees).
Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory
This accessible introduction features case studies in online advertising, spectrum auctions, kidney exchange, and network management.
Algorithms, Part II
This book is Part II of the fourth edition of Robert Sedgewick and Kevin Wayne’s Algorithms, the leading textbook on algorithms today, widely used in colleges and universities worldwide. Part II contains Chapters 4 through 6 of the book. The fourth edition of Algorithms surveys the most important computer algorithms currently in use and provides a full treatment of data structures and algorithms for sorting, searching, graph processing, and string processing -- including fifty algorithms every programmer should know. In this edition, new Java implementations are written in an accessible modular programming style, where all of the code is exposed to the reader and ready to use. The algorith...
Robust Mechanism Design
Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
